Der STERN berichtet über eine Umfrage zu einem Thema, zu dem die deutsche Bevölkerung bekanntlich nichts zu sagen hat, dem Dritten Weltkrieg. Das liegt allerdings nicht daran, dass die Bevölkerung in diesem Staat aus „guten Gründen“ grundsätzlich überhaupt nichts zu melden hat, sondern es geht hier um ein Thema, bei dem noch nicht mal die Bundesregierung frei entscheiden kann, sondern sich in einer führenden Dienerrolle sieht. So ist es auch kein Wunder, dass die Meinungen der Befragten nicht ganz dem entsprechen, was auf allen Kanälen von als „öffentliche Meinung“ veröffentlicht wird.
Das vielleicht schönste Beispiel für Meinungsumfragen in Deutschland, quasi die Mutter aller solcher Umfragen, sind die OMGUS-Surverys. Im Auftrag der amerikanischen Militärregierung wurden von 1945-1945 regelmäßig die Zustimmungswerte zur Politik und den Maßnahmen der neuen Herren abgefragt. Interessant sind dabei nicht nur die Antworten, sondern auch die Fragen. Manche haben auch heute noch Bedeutung, andere sind einfach nur herrlich.
Report No. 69 (16 October 1947)
GERMAN OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE
Sample: 3,400 people living in the American Zone and the American and British Sectors of Berlin. Interviewing dates: August 1947. (5 pp.)
This report deals with German reactions to two issues involved in the possible organization of Europe: a „United States of Europe,“ and the Marshall Plan. On many issues of the day, the German people were apathetic, resigned, or persistently deluded. On some issues, however, such as turning to the west for economic and world leadership, their opinions were crystallized in positive directions. Regarding intra-European matters, their orientation was also largely western. Asked to select from a checklist of 23 countries those which they thought should become part of a European nation, majorities of varying degrees voted to include each of the countries named except the Soviet Union, for which 38 per cent of the AMZON respondents voted. In this climate of opinion the Marshall Plan could not fail to elicit high approval. In August 1947, however, knowledge of the plan was neither extensive nor definite. Only 47 per cent claimed to have heard of it, and the amount of information held by about half of this group was extremely shaky. Not unexpectedly, educational background had a great deal to do with the level of information. After a brief description of the plan, all those interviewed were asked whether they thought it would solve Europe’s economic difficulties; a large majority in AMZON (78%) and even more West Berliners (88%) thought it would. Separate population groups did not differ significantly in their estimation of the possibihties of working out Secretary of State Marshall’s proposal. There was nonetheless one telling factor that differentiated those expressing confidence in the plan from those who did not. Among the confident, 75 per cent were convinced that the United States would have the greatest influence on world affairs during the next decade and only 12 per cent thought that the Soviet Union would play this dominant role. Those expressing skepticism about the Marshall Plan were much more likely than the confident to believe that the Soviet role would be dominant (27%) and less often expected American leadership (58%).
Report No. 73 (28 October 1947)
A GUIDE TO SOME PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS
Sample: a representative sample of 500 adults in West Berlin. Interviewing dates: unspecified. (1 1 pp.)
Four types of statements on 14 topics were used: One set was unfavorable to the United States, another was phrased favorably, the third presented alternative propositions in as fair and objective a manner as possible, and the fourth was unfavorable to the United States with the source of the charge given as the Soviet Union. The average number giving favorable responses to the „objective“ or „balanced“ questions was 75 per cent. This figure moved up only three percentage points to 78 per cent in response to the statements with a pro-American bias but moved down ten percentage points to 65 per cent in response to anti-American propositions. When these anti-American propositions were identified as Russian-sponsored, the average moved up to 81 per cent. The claim presented in one question that imperialistic aims underlay United States foreign policy had real plausibility to the Germans unless presented as a Soviet claim. Statements dealing with capitalistic domination of America were particularly disadvantageous to the United States; counterclaims to these did not relieve the effectiveness of such charges. At least one „favorable“ overstatement, regarding the treatment of N****** in the United States, elicited a more negative response (with 58 per cent of the sample responding in a pro-American fashion) than the comparable „unfavorable“ (77%) and „balanced“ (81%) statement. Asked after the interview (which included 15 or more additional questions) to recall the one or two statements which first came to mind, people tended to recall unfavorable rather than commentary statements about the United States. Generally best remembered were statements about the treatment of N******, followed by the charge that a third of America’s population was ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed, allegations that the United States was determined to dominate the world, or that American society was composed of moneygrabbing people.
Report No. 77 (5 November 1947)
OPINIONS ON THE PRESS IN THE AMERICAN ZONE OF GERMANY
Sample: approximately 3,400 people living in the American Zone and in the American and British Sectors of Berlin. Interviewing dates: July 1947. (13 pp.)
Almost half (47%) of the AMZON respondents felt that there was a free press in AMZON; in West Berlin the figure was as high as 66 per cent. Over two-thirds (68%) of those who read the Neue Zeitung, which was published by the American authorities, considered this paper to be free. Six out of ten (60%) of those interviewed did not think that German editors were permitted to print everything theyconsidered to be correct and two-thirds (64%) felt that they ought to be allowed to do so. About one in ten (6 per cent in AMZON; 12 per cent in West Berlin) preferred a party press to an independent press although a large number of people (27 and 42 per cent, respectively) were willing to have political parties publish newspapers if independent papers continued to be published as well. Much of the sentiment against the party press reflected the negative attitudes toward poHtical parties generally. At the same time there was a great deal of misinformation about the party press; over half of those living in AMZON did not know that existing papers were independently edited. Among the informed respondents, there was more sentiment in favor of an independent press than among the uninformed.
Report No. 105 (27 March 1948)
INTERNATIONALISM IN GERMANY
Sample: 3,750 people 18 years of age or older in the American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. Interviewing dates: first three weeks of March 1948. (7 pp.)
Half (49%) of the people interviewed had heard of plans to create a Western European Union; those with more than twelve years of education were much more likely to have heard of it (94%) as was true of those with upper- and upper-middle-class status (85%). Almost no one opposed the idea of such a union and confidence in its realization was fairly high. Nonetheless, obstacles were known to exist. Only one in 20 (5%) saw no obstacles, while about 35 per cent gave no response. Of those who thought the chances for realization of such a union were very high, 48 per cent cited the Soviet Union and communism as possible difficulties, another 16 per cent mentioned nationalism. Of those who thought the chances were poor or even nil, 35 per cent mentioned the Soviet Union and communism, 41 per cent cited nationalism, and 14 per cent could give no reason. While a solid majority (59%) of the general public and even more West Berliners (66%) believed that there would be another world war within a generation, a large number of people (45%) thought that a Western European Union would decrease the possibilities of such a war. Only 13 per cent felt the union would increase the possibilities for war. Significantly, of the small percentage of persons (3%) who opposed the idea of a Western European Union, two-thirds (65%) thought that it would either increase or not affect the chances for a third world war. Practically the same people who knew about the Western European Union also knew about the United Nations. But confidence that the UN could secure peace was markedly lower than was confidence in the possibility of realizing a Western European Union. Only about a third (35%) of the people who had ever heard of the UN granted that it had a fair or better than fair chance of ensuring peace. In contrast, 45 per cent of all the people believed that a Western European Union would decrease the chances of war, if not prevent one.